## AFF

### PDCP

#### Security cooperation includes development of economic capabilities

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589722.pdf>

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

### PDB

#### The private sector and military can work together.

Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovíc 06-16-2022 [Former President of Croatia, Defense One, “NATO Must Ensure Defense and Civilian Industries Work Together,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/nato-must-ensure-defense-and-civilian-industries-work-together/368250///ZW]

The internet, microwaves, and synthetic rubber came into our lives as products invented for military purposes. Even everyday things, such as undershirts and concentrated fruit juice were created to improve the combat readiness of armed forces. Though many people typically associate the military with war and suffering, this industry has been a source of incredible progress, producing inventions that made our lives longer, healthier, and easier. These days, innovation is likely to run the other way, with the military benefiting from inventions developed with private funding. A symbiotic relationship between military needs and human progress is not necessarily the default. Instead, it requires a well-oiled innovation ecosystem in which military and civilian industries share their expertise and knowledge with one another. NATO has recently announced several initiatives to build on past success, but more are needed—particularly as members increase their military funding. Virtually all alliance members are investing more in defense or are soon planning to do so. Germany, for example, declared that it would create a 100-billion-Euro fund and reach its 2% goal in 2022. Poland, which shares the longest EU border with Ukraine, has taken in more than 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees and promised to dedicate 3% of its GDP to defense. Croatia ramped up its defense investment to 2.3% of GDP. To ensure that this new investment spurs innovation and co-operation between military and civilian industries as well as academia, NATO announced in April the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. DIANA will concentrate on deep technologies, including artificial intelligence, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, novel materials, and outer space. In addition, 17 NATO nations have agreed to set up the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund. It will invest 1 billion Euros in early-stage startups and other deep tech funds aligned with its strategic objectives. But NATO members need to do more to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and China, who are also increasing spending on military research and development. The trends make this clear. In 1960, the U.S. accounted for 69 percent of global R&D investments, with U.S. defense-related R&D accounting for no less than 36% of global spending. The bulk (65%) of U.S. investments in defense-related R&D was financed from the federal budget. However, by 2019, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 30%, and the share of federal government investment in defense-related R&D fell from 65% to 21%, whereas the share of business investment in R&D has grown from 33% to 71%. This leaves no doubt that meaningful innovation is not possible without close co-operation with the private sector. As NATO prepares to adopt its next Strategic Concept at the summit in Madrid, it is essential that it focus on mechanisms that maintain its technological advantage. As part of GLOBSEC’s work at the Future Security and Defense Council, we have proposed several ideas to help promote innovation in the Alliance. We are convinced that NATO’s innovation ecosystem must integrate public and private sectors to ensure this edge.

### Solvency

#### The counterplan fails--- the government and private sector don’t trust each other.

Evelyn Farkas 08-11-2011 [Evelyn N. Farkas, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for Public-Private Partnership to the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and Commander, U.S. European Command, Atlantic Council, “Public-Private Collaboration in NATO,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/publicprivate-collaboration-in-nato///ZW]

From Evelyn Farkas, U.S. European Command: “Why should the public and private sectors collaborate today?” The answer? The complex challenges that we face around the world today often require skills and approaches beyond traditional military capabilities. Collaboration allows us to meet these challenges utilizing specific expertise found in the private sector. The private sector can provide agility, swift innovation, and a unique resource set. Together, government and private entities can reduce shared risks, minimize costs, and address mutual threats like terrorism, organized crime, cyber attacks, and climate change. The government gains access to the private sector’s expertise and resources, and private sector entities benefit from the information sharing involved in collaboration and the legitimacy gained from meeting complex challenges to provide for the greater good. . . . NATO adopted a comprehensive approach that recognized the need to build partnerships with non-military entities both inside and outside the government. With this in mind, in 2008, NATO launched the Building Integrity Initiative, which works with private NGOs like Transparency International, to reduce corruption in defense establishments in Europe and Afghanistan. . . . First, is the issue of trust. Neither sector likes to broadly share information about vulnerabilities. Corporations worry that it could lead to the public revelation of weaknesses and of sensitive intellectual property. The government is cautious about disclosing national security vulnerabilities to private entities that have international ownership or global interests and about safeguarding the privacy of U.S. citizens. And finally, there is the problem of how to institutionalize this collaboration. Because the responsibility for advancing public-private collaboration is so decentralized, optimization and coordination of efforts across the government has proven to be difficult.

### Impact Turn

#### Confronting China causes overstretch and escalation spirals.

Depetris 8-18-2020, fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Washington Examiner. (Daniel Depetris, "China isn't the Soviet Union, and the US needs to find a different way to compete", *Business Insider*, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-needs-to-find-different-way-to-compete-with-china-2020-8)

Unfortunately, simplifying China as a modern-day Soviet Union misdiagnoses the problem and leads to a faulty cure. Combatting Chinese power everywhere and anywhere will exhaust the US, deplete its resources and weaken US power over the long-term.

For nearly 30 years, the Washington foreign policy establishment has gotten used to the United States being the paramount power in the global system. But this is no longer the world we are living in.

While the US is still the world's largest military and economic power, China is a close second. Since the dawn of the century, the Chinese economy has increased from $1.2 trillion to $14.3 trillion. China's exponential growth has allowed the CCP to invest additional resources into building up a capable, modernized and proficient military, including a world-class navy.

With its frequent forays into Japanese waters, flyovers across the Taiwan Straits, and trillion-dollar Belt and Road initiative in Eurasia, China is doing what rising powers have done throughout history — translating its economic success into geopolitical leverage. A US policy of containment would have the adverse affect of heightening the sense of alarmism in Beijing.

The U.S. can and should compete with China economically. But it should do so responsibly in order to prevent this competitiveness from drifting into military affairs.

A decoupling from China, Washington's largest trading partner outside of North America, is not a realistic proposal. A complete severance of economic ties will produce unprecedented pain for middle-class Americans and roil the international financial system.

A military-to-military showdown, meanwhile, simply entrenches hardline positions in both Washington and Beijing and lessens the credibility of those who call for dialogue and deescalation.

#### China rise is peaceful now---encirclement makes it fast and hostile.

Goldstein 20, associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College. (Lyle, 7-22-2020, "China’s Putative Threat to U.S. National Security", Published in *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/chinas-putative-threat-us-national-security)

Factions and interests on both the right and the left are now disturbingly united in an effort to cast China as the next multidimensional threat to the U.S.—on par with or even exceeding that of the Soviet Union in its dimensions. Many of those interests, moreover, are poised to profit from such a characterization. A few obvious facts, however, are worth repeating when considering the putative threat posed by China to U.S. national security: China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting. In the coming decades, all of those metrics may reverse, and China could morph from a bungling, paranoid panda into a fire‐​breathing, goose‐​stepping dragon. It seems likely that Beijing will have the requisite resources, bureaucratic discipline, and talent to make such a transition. Moreover, it is not short of strategists advocating for more aggressive steps to counter the United States.41 Washington’s overall goal should be to forestall that metamorphosis, in part by acknowledging China’s security concerns and by seeking compromises on the many issues that divide the United States and China, as outlined in the previous section. It is worth reiterating that Beijing is planning neither to attack the United States nor to conquer East Asia. Rather, its foreign policy behavior has, by and large, comported itself well with current international norms—in rather stark contrast to Moscow’s much more confrontational approach toward the West.

#### US retrenchment prevents war from status competition and gives China a peaceful stake in the current order

**Ward, 17** - Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 217-218

The former approach is one that few policymakers and scholars openly promote.23 If the United States is interested in avoiding the creation of a deeply revisionist, anti-Western China, it needs to accommodate China’s status claims. Since these likely include the right to a sphere of influence in East Asia, accommodation would likely have to involve a reduction of the American military presence and American influence in that region. This does not mean conceding global leadership to China. Rather, the aim would be to acknowledge that China, as a great power, deserves the same rights that the United States does in world politics – including the right to manage East Asia and the South China Sea the way that the United States manages Latin America and the Caribbean.

This approach carries with it great risks and costs as well.What would be the effect on navigation and trade through the South China Sea? Would important American allies like Japan and South Korea turn into Beijing’s vassals? What if an American withdrawal from East Asia produces a regional arms race? And what if China grows more ambitious rather than more satisfied as the United States withdraws overseas?

But accommodation/retrenchment also has some important advantages. Foremost among them is that it avoids antagonizing Beijing: it is premised upon the idea that, all else equal, accommodation is preferable to denial because denial activates forces that empower hardliners. Accommodation holds out the possibility of empowering moderates and facilitating China’s integration within a reformed version of the liberal international order that has served its economic interests well. Another advantage is that accommodation/ retrenchment is cheaper than any approach involving containment. Retrenchment would reduce American military expenditures while simultaneously creating incentives for other regional powers to bear a greater share of their defense burdens. The United States could return to an offshore balancing posture, which would allow it to redeploy to the region only if China tried to overthrow the new version of the status quo order by, say launching a war in East Asia. But by not signaling status denial, Washington would short circuit one of the major causes of radical revisionist challenges in history, thereby reducing the likelihood that active onshore balancing would be necessary.